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This paper studies the impact of financial reporting scrutiny on (private) debt contracting in the
presence of two capital market frictions: a cash-diversion problem and an asset-substitution problem.
When cash flow realizations are not verifiable, firms have an incentive to divert cash by manipulating
their accounting reports. When firms’ project choices are not verifiable, post-financing, they may
have an incentive to choose riskier projects than desired by their financiers. While earlier work
has mostly examined these two frictions independently, they are intricately linked: to address
the cash-diversion problem, an optimal contract resembles a debt contract, which in turn causes
the asset-substitution problem. Holding the scrutiny of financial reporting fixed, I show that the
emergence of the asset-substitution problem, instead of compounding the existing inefficiencies
from the cash-diversion problem, may lead to improved investment efficiency and more socially
efficient risk-taking. On the other hand, increased reporting scrutiny may undermine investment
efficiency (i.e., decrease banks’ lending) and adversely affect firms’ risk-shifting from a social welfare
perspective.
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Chapter 1
Earnings Manipulation and Asset
Substitution: Real Effects of Financial
Reporting Scrutiny on Debt
Contracting
1.1 Introduction
In debt markets, there are two well-known frictions that afflict the financing of projects. When
cash flow realizations are not verifiable, firms have an incentive to divert cash and hide the traces of
cash-diversion by manipulating their accounting reports, i.e., a cash-diversion problem (Townsend,
1979). When firms’ project (risk) choices are not verifiable, post-financing, they may have an
incentive to choose riskier projects than desired by their lenders, i.e., an asset-substitution problem
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Regulators have suggested that enhancing the scrutiny of financial
reporting could raise funding in capital markets by alleviating frictions, especially the cash-diversion
problem.1 However, because in practice these frictions often occur together, the impact of enhanced
1In “Testimony Concerning the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” in April 2005, William H. Donaldson, then
chairman of SEC, remarked: “The Act also has helped the Commission to restore investor confidence in the capital
markets by strengthening enforcement ... and compensate injured investors.”
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financial reporting scrutiny on banks’ lending and firms’ risk-shifting is not clear a priori.
In this paper, I develop a model that links the cost of earnings manipulation to firms’ risk-
shifting and their access to capital. I establish that the cash-diversion and asset-substitution prob-
lems are endogenously linked: to address the cash-diversion problem, an optimal contract resembles
a debt contract, which in turn causes the asset-substitution problem. When firms’ project choices
are contractible, and therefore the cash-diversion problem is the only friction, enhanced financial
reporting scrutiny (increased manipulation cost) always boosts banks’ lending (i.e., investment
efficiency increases). Holding the scrutiny of reporting fixed, if firms’ project choices become non-
contractible, I show that the emergence of the asset-substitution problem, instead of compounding
the existing inefficiencies from the cash-diversion problem, may lead to improved investment ef-
ficiency and more socially efficient risk-taking. Finally, through the link between the frictions, I
show enhanced financial reporting scrutiny may decrease banks’ lending (i.e., investment efficiency
decreases) and adversely affect firms’ risk-shifting from a social welfare perspective.
I demonstrate these results in a model building on Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). In my
model, a firm seeks financing from a bank and then chooses the riskiness of its project. The bank
offers the firm a take-it-or-leave-it contract, which makes the model more applicable to private
debt markets. Following Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the contract cannot be tied explicitly to
realized cash flows but instead must rely on the firm’s report, which might be manipulated. Due
to this nonverifiability problem, the firm has an incentive to divert cash and erase the trace of
cash-diversion by manipulating its reports downward. I assume a regulator can make accounting
earnings manipulation costly, which I refer to as the scrutiny of financial reporting (Ewert and
Wagenhofer, 2005; Laux and Stocken, 2012, 2015; Laux, 2014; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic,
2014).
I employ a two-period setting to capture a long-term contract. The bank chooses the following
contract terms: the first- and second-period repayments and the loan-continuation probabilities
(the probabilities a second loan will be offered) as a function of first-period reports.2 The model
2In practice, loan contracts between corporations and banks are often long-term arrangements. For instance, in
syndicated loan markets, after initial loans are offered, there are various financial assistance programs called credit
facilities (syndicated loans facilities). Thus the loan continuation probabilities can be interpreted as debt covenants:
the more rigorous terms and conditions in covenants, the lower the continuation probability.
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adopts a reduced form of the borrower’s ex post risk-taking, narrowing it down to a project choice
between a risky and a safe project. Both projects are socially profitable: the safe (risky) project
is more likely to hit medium cash flow (high or low cash flows). This captures the well-known
asset-substitution (or risk-shifting) behavior.
To study the links among manipulation cost, loan-continuation probabilities, and a firm’s risk-
taking, I compare two different settings. In the one setting (“the benchmark”), I assume the
project choice is contractible, meaning the bank directly prescribes in the contract which project
to implement. In the other setting (“the main setting”), the project choice is not contractible;
therefore the bank offers a contract, followed by the firm choosing a project in its own interest,
potentially giving rise to the asset-substitution problem.
In the benchmark setting, since the project choice is contractible, the sole focus of the bank is to
address the cash-diversion problem. With a small manipulation cost, as in Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990), the bank uses socially inefficient loan rationing as a way to protect itself from the firm’s cash-
diverting behavior: the higher the first-period report, the higher the loan-continuation probability. 3
Consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the optimal contract resembles a debt contract. As
enhanced scrutiny of financial reporting mitigates the firm’s incentive to manipulate, thus relaxing
the cash-diversion problem, the bank uses less loan rationing. In fact, with a sufficiently large
manipulation cost, the bank guarantees the second loan for any report. As a result, the optimal
contract is no longer a debt contract. In sum, when the project choice is contractible, enhanced
financial reporting scrutiny has an unambiguously positive impact on investment efficiency, captured
by monotonically increasing loan-continuation probabilities.
The main setting illustrates the firm’s risk-shifting by taking the project (risk) choice to be
noncontractible. As argued above, the optimal response to address the cash-diversion problem is a
debt contract, which in turn causes the asset-substitution problem.4 In my two-period setting, by
3The bank guarantees the second loan for a high report and lends it with a positive probability for a medium
report. In particular, the bank commits to cutting off the second loan (termination threat) for a low cash flow report
as a way to mitigate the firm’s incentive to manipulate its reports downward (i.e., it uses the access to future capital
to address the firm’s cash-diversion incentives).
4Unless the scrutiny of reporting is sufficiently intense and therefore the cash-diversion problem is not relaxed
enough, an optimal contract resembles a debt contract. If the scrutiny of reporting is sufficiently enhanced, an optimal
contract is no longer a debt contract, and asset-substitution is not an issue.
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using the prospect of future lending, the bank could achieve socially efficient risk-taking. However,
being biased in favor of safety (standard debt), the bank offers a contract that is designed to make
the firm choose the safe project even if it has (moderately) lower expected value than the risky
one.5
Holding the scrutiny of reporting fixed, I compare the main and benchmark settings to show
that integrating the asset-substitution problem with the existing cash-diversion problem leads to
increased investment efficiency and more socially efficient risk-taking. The bank now uses the
loan-continuation probabilities for tackling both agency problems. Again, the bank addresses the
cash-diversion problem by using socially inefficient loan rationing, but to a lesser extent than
the (contractible) benchmark. Specifically, for a medium report, the bank offers a higher loan-
continuation probability than the benchmark level as a way to induce the firm to choose the safe
project while not adjusting the other loan-continuation probabilities; i.e., the bank addresses the
asset-substitution problem at the expense of exacerbating the cash-diversion problem.6 In other
words, the bank raises its lending, which in turn increases the social surplus. Moreover, in the
benchmark setting, the bank fully aligns the riskiness of the firm’s business to its own preferred
(excessively safe) level. But if the project choice is not contractible, the bank lets the firm take
some additional socially efficient risk to avoid the agency rents necessary to fully restrain the firm’s
risk-taking.
In the main setting, enhanced financial reporting scrutiny not only relaxes the cash-diversion
problem but also indirectly relaxes the asset-substitution problem through the contract. The key
is that the increased manipulation cost affords the bank more leeway to differentiate repayments
for each report. In particular, it enables the bank to reduce a repayment for a report that signals a
safe project choice. Thus, the bank can better control the firm’s risk-taking through the elaborate
design of the financial contract terms.7
5An often-mentioned concern regarding the asset-substitution effect, following Jensen and Meckling (1976), sug-
gests the firm may take excessive risk from a social welfare perspective (e.g., choosing a risky project with a low
NPV). As a result, the literature has focused on mitigating firms’ excessive risk-taking through contracts (Brander
and Poitevin, 1992; John and John, 1993; Diamond, 1989, 1991).
6Reducing the gap of the continuation probabilities between high and medium reports exacerbates the firm’s
truthful reporting incentive for high cash flow realization.
7In other words, increased manipulation cost relaxes the cash-diversion problem, while at the same time makes
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Contrary to the benchmark setting, now the impact of enhanced financial reporting scrutiny
on investment efficiency is nonmonotonic (U-shaped). With a small manipulation cost, an increase
in the latter undermines investment efficiency, because in response to the increased manipulation
cost, the bank decreases the loan-continuation probability for a medium report while holding other
loan-continuation probabilities fixed.8 At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive because a
medium report is a signal of a safe project choice. Recall that the bank pays incremental agency
rents by offering a higher continuation probability for a medium report than the benchmark level.
As previously discussed, the increased manipulation cost enables the bank to better control the
firm’s risk-taking through differentiating repayment amounts for each report. Thus, the bank
more actively uses loan rationing to protect itself from the firm’s cash-diverting behavior, reducing
the continuation probability for a medium report towards the benchmark level (i.e., investment
efficiency decreases).
With a sufficiently large manipulation cost, the bank can effectively control the firm’s risk-
taking simply through the prescribed repayments. Since asset substitution is no longer a concern,
the bank uses the loan-continuation probabilities only for addressing the cash-diversion problem
as in the (contractible) benchmark. Then, as the further increase in reporting scrutiny provides
even better protection from the firm’s cash-diverting behavior, the bank weakly increases its future
lending (i.e., investment efficiency increases).
The model predicts that the impact of enhanced financial reporting scrutiny on the firm’s
risk-taking also is nonmonotonic. This is because the increased manipulation cost mitigates the
bank’s bias for the safe project. With a small manipulation cost, since the firm’s manipulation
incentive has not been sufficiently mitigated (i.e., the cash-diversion problem still persists), the
optimal contract resembles a debt contract, which in turn makes the bank biased toward the safe
project. Therefore, as the bank can better control the firm’s risk-taking through differentiating
the repayment amounts, the bank more aggressively pushes the firm to choose the safe project. In
contrast, with a sufficiently large manipulation cost, as the amount that the bank can extract from
each project gets closer to the total surplus, the bank’s preference over the projects converges to
the repayments more effective incentive instruments, which in turn enables the bank to relax the asset-substitution
problem.
8That is, the bank still guarantees the second loan for a high report but uses the termination threat.
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the socially efficient one. Thus, the bank eventually induces the firm to take the socially efficient
level of risk.
The model in this paper primarily applies to private or public companies that utilize private
debt markets as major sources of external funding.9 Under the current legislative regime, GAAP
and audit choices by U.S. private firms are not determined by regulatory fiat. Regulators and
researchers are debating whether it is necessary to make these private companies subject to U.S.
GAAP, with an aim of increasing the informativeness of their financial reporting (FAF, 2011). In
the noncontractible project-choice setting in this paper, with a small manipulation cost, increased
scrutiny of financial reporting (which is one way to interpret the mandatory adoption of GAAP)
may lead to more loan rationing (less future lending) and risk-taking distortions.
Conversely, the model predicts that reduced manipulation cost (e.g., moving toward fair-value
accounting) may lead to “covenant-lite lending” (i.e., less rationing and less control of the firm’s risk-
taking). One caveat is that my model does not capture nonaccounting covenants (i.e., all contract
terms are tied to the firm’s financial accounting reports).10 Ball, Li and Shivakumar (2015) docu-
ment that, after the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
the use of accounting-based debt covenants significantly decreased while that of nonaccounting
covenants increased. They argue that fair-value accounting reduces the “contractibility” of ac-
counting numbers, and therefore banks switch to nonaccounting debt covenants. An interesting
extension is the incorporation of nonaccounting covenants into the model to study whether banks
perfectly substitute nonaccounting covenants for accounting covenants as the latter become less
contractible.
The results also can be interpreted as an alternative explanation of real earnings management.
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) have studied conditions under which accounting-based and real earn-
9There are approximately 28 million private (14,000 public) companies in the U.S. (FAF, 2011). Private firms
attract a significant amount of capital and control more than $10 trillion of assets in the U.S. (Lisowsky and Minnis,
2013). In the model, the firm does not issue an equity and therefore has less incentive to manipulate its reports
upward than public firms (Givoly, Hayn and Katz, 2010). Although the setting may better fit private firms, the
essential message of paper still holds for public firms because enhanced reporting scrutiny deters both upward and
downward earnings manipulation.
10This is consistent with the assumption that a regulator can make accounting earnings manipulation costly through
enhanced scrutiny of financial reporting.
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ings management are substitutes. Empirical studies document that, after the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002, accruals management declined, while real-activity manipulation increased (Cohen
et al., 2008; Zhang, 2012). My model suggests that, with a small accounting manipulation cost, as
it becomes more costly, the firm will reduce the riskiness of its business (e.g., reduce R&D invest-
ments). Prior studies have argued that firms deliberately substitute real for accruals management
as the latter becomes more expensive. Instead, this paper suggests a complementary explanation:
banks may induce firms to take less risk than the socially efficient level through contracts.11
The recognition of the firm’s risk-shifting behavior at the cost of sacrificing expected profit
dates back to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
also observed the borrower’s excessive risk-taking incentive under debt financing. Hart (1985)
criticized this approach and observed that the asset-substitution problem could be solved by profit
sharing. This paper adds to this stream of literature by establishing an endogenous link between
the cash-diversion and asset-substitution problems through optimal debt contracting.
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) modeled optimal profit-contingent contracts
with verification cost from investors. In contrast, assuming outcomes are nonverifiable, this paper
studies optimal contracts with misreporting cost. Expanding these one-period models, Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) studied how a firm’s performance affects its financing costs and its access to
capital. Specifically, they showed how staged financing arrangements reduce incentive problems
between firms and financiers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) also argued that the termination threat is
an effective device, but the contract they considered is not optimal. Switching bargaining power
to the borrower, Povel and Raith (2004) studied optimal debt contracts when firms’ investment is
unobservable but not considering misreporting cost. Building on Bolton and Scharfstein (1990),
with the asset-substitution problem, this paper studies the impact of increased misreporting cost
on optimal debt contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the model. Section
1.3 examines the benchmark case in which the project choice is contractible (i.e., there is no asset-
substitution problem). Section 1.4 illustrates the asset-substitution problem by taking the firm’s
project (risk) choice to be noncontractible. Section 1.5 concludes.
11Therefore, in reality, we may observe a higher level of “real earnings management” than the expected level that
perfectly substitutes for the reduced level of “accounting-based earnings management.”
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1.2 Model
I model the interaction between a bank (lender) and a firm (borrower) building on Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2. The firm is financially constrained and needs
a fixed amount of investment F at date 0. I assume that the bank has the bargaining power and
offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the firm at date 0.12 After accepting the contract, the firm
chooses one of two projects, a safe or a risky one. Denote the project choice as k ∈ {s, r}, where s
represents the safe project and r represents the risky one. It is common knowledge that each project





respectively. Denote the first- (second-) period cash flow realization by x1(x2) and an expected




LL. Once the firm chooses a project, the distributions
of cash flow for both periods are iid. That is, the choice of project can be interpreted as a long-term
strategic decision made by the firm that has an impact on both date 1 and 2 cash flows.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm needs additional fixed investment F . That is, if
the bank decides not to lend additional F (termination threat), the firm cannot continue to operate
its business.13 I impose the following parametric joint condition on the cash flow realizations, the
expected value of each project and the required investment level:14
Assumption 1 H > μk > M > F > L: each project is socially profitable (μk − F > 0), and with
probability pkL, the bank incurs a loss (i.e., risky debt: L − F < 0).
Also, to describe the asset-substitution problem in a parsimonious manner, I assume the fol-
12 The assumption that lenders rather than borrowers have all bargaining power may seem unrealistic, particularly
for public debt (corporate bond) market since it tends to be fairly competitive. However, in private debt (loan)
market (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995), small firms or even large firms that have to
borrow from banks are less likely to have bargaining power, especially when firms need external funding in order to
sustain their business.
13This can be satisfied by assuming H −L < F . That is, even though the firm has hidden money by manipulation,
it is not enough to continue its business. Another case is that, even if H − L > F , the firm still cannot continue
its business, assuming the bank can write a covenant that the firm is not allowed to continue this particular project
without the bank’s permission. If the continuation of project is verifiable, such covenant is feasible.
14The reason for ranking H > μk > M is to capture more descriptive results. As I will discuss in section 1.3, if
M > μk, the results of the model becomes equivalent to a binary outcomes setting.
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lowing parametric restrictions on the distributions of projects:


















3 + ε), (
1
3 − ε − η), (
1
3 + η)}.
Note ε represents the upside potential, and η represents the downside risk of the risky project.15
Together with X = {L,M,H}, these determine the parties’ preferences over the projects. A natural
parametric restriction for ε and η is ε ∈ [0, 13 − η] to ensure p
r
xt ∈ [0, 1], ∀xt ∈ X, ∀t = 1, 2.
Throughout the paper, I fix η > 0 and let ε vary to cover all possible rankings between μr and μs.
As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), a key assumption is that the cash flow realizations are
nonverifiable to the bank.16 Therefore the bank cannot offer a contract explicitly contingent on
realized cash flow but instead must rely on the firm’s report, which might be manipulated. Denote
the firm’s reports for date t by x̂t, t = 1, 2. Specifically, if the firm privately observes xt and
manipulates to x̂t 6= xt, then it bears a cost of α|x̂t − xt| ≡ αΔx̂txt , where α ≥ 0 represents the
marginal manipulation cost. Similar to Laux and Stocken (2012, 2015) and Beyer, Guttman, and
Marinovic (2014), the manipulation cost may reflect time and effort spent devising creative ways
to detour regulations.17 That is, α captures the scrutiny of financial reporting.
Due to this costly manipulation, α > 0, the usual restriction of focusing on incentive-compatible
direct-revelation mechanisms (“truthtelling”) is not a priori valid because the revelation principle
(Myerson, 1979) relies on costless communication between a principal and an agent. Therefore
it is required to check whether the bank wants the firm to manipulate its report. In Appendix
B, I show, when α > 0 and the cash flows are nonverifiable, truthful reporting is the unique
15The safe project is more likely to hit the medium cash flow realization, psM > p
r
M , and the risky project is more







16From Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), another scenario for the impossibility of writing a contract explicitly on
the realized cash flows is observable but nonverifiable cash flows. In this paper, since I focus on the ex-ante optimal
contract, observability of cash flow realizations does not matter as long as it is nonverifiable.
17Also, it can be interpreted as the amount of fee that must be paid for hiring a financial engineer to manipulate
reports. Another interpretation of α is, a probability of getting caught by the outside auditor. Note α > 1 is not an
interesting area since the firm has no incentive to manipulate its reports (the amount of cash the firm can divert is
smaller than the cost), and therefore the bank can extract all surplus. Thus, to incentivize the firm to choose the
safe (risky) project, the bank pays δ > 0 for a report that signals a safe (risky) project choice. As a result, neither
the cash-diversion nor the asset-substitution problems matter. The form of the manipulation cost is assumed to be
linear for the tractability. Later, I will discuss how the results are affected when the cost becomes convex.
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optimal reporting function to be induced by the bank. By the revelation principle, when α = 0,
any equilibrium outcome that induces the firm to manipulate can be replicated by truthtelling
equilibrium. As manipulation becomes costly, to induce the firm to manipulate its report, the bank
has to compensate this manipulation cost. Therefore switching to the truthtelling equilibrium
makes the bank strictly better off.
Since the firm cannot continue its business without additional funding at the beginning of
the second period, one of the key choices of the bank at date 0 is the loan-continuation strat-




x1}, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X = {L,M,H}, where Rt represents the repayment from the firm to
the bank at date t = 1, 2 for given reported cash flows and βx1 represents the continuation prob-
ability for the second loan, F , if the firm’s report is x1.18 Since the firm has no resources at the
outset, the maximum amounts that the bank can charge at date 1 and 2 are as follows: Rx11 ≤ x1,




1.3 Optimal Contract Without an Asset-Substitution Problem
In this section, I investigate the benchmark setting with contractible project choice. That is, the
bank can directly prescribe a project choice at date 0. The firm’s scope for strategic behavior then
is confined to diverting cash by misreporting the realized cash flows. Therefore, the main objective
of this section is to study the impact of financial reporting scrutiny, as proxied by the manipulation
cost, α, on the optimal contract and the resulting investment efficiency for a given project choice
by the bank.
18Throughout the paper, I assume there exists an enforceable randomization scheme. For instance, the bank can
design terms (e.g., accounting ratios) in debt covenants that the firm can achieve the hurdles with some probability.
Another interpretation for {βx1} is a capital-expansion plan contingent on the firm’s report. In this case, F can be
interpreted as the amount of cash that the bank has at the beginning of the second period and therefore βx1 ∙ F
represents the size of the second loan offer.
19As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the implicit assumption is the firm must retain profits until the end of the
second period.
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1.3.1 The bank’s problem with contractible project choice
I begin by studying the effect of α on the optimal contract, taking the project choice, k, as prescribed





k }, k = s, r.
The sequence of events is summarized in Timeline I:
-
date 0
Bank prescribes k and
offers a contract Ck(α),
lending F .
date 1
Firm observes x1 and
reports x̂1. Payoffs at
t = 1 are determined.
Bank lends second F




Payoffs at t = 2
are determined.
Timeline I – Contractible Project Choice















































































2,k )] ≥ 0, (IR)
with limited liability constraints
(LLx11 ) : R
x1
1,k ≤ x1, (LL
x1x2
2 ) : R
x1x2
2,k ≤ x1 − R
x1





(TTt), t = 1, 2 ensure, when realized cash flow is xt, the firm does not report x
′
t 6= xt. In
contrast to (TT2), multiple incentive instruments affect the firm’s truthtelling incentive in (TT1):
20The reason for studying this unrealistic benchmark contract is that, in section 1.4, I use it to investigate when
the parties have a disagreement over the project choice; i.e., the asset-substitution problem arises.
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{Rt,k}, t = 1, 2, and {βk}. Denote the set of truthtelling constraints that prevent the firm from
manipulating its reports downward (upward) at t = 1 and t = 2 by (TT1,↓), (TT2,↓) ((TT1,↑),
(TT2,↑)), respectively.
1.3.2 The optimal contract for a given project
As α increases, {R1,k, R2,k} become more effective instruments for eliciting truthful reports.
21 For
instance, when α = 0, as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), (TT2) implies that R
x1x2
2,k = L for all
x1, x2. Also, without using the continuation probabilities (β
x1
k = 1, ∀x1), R
x1
1,k = L for all x1, since






1,k. That is, the only incentive instruments that the bank can use
to increase the firm’s truthtelling incentive are the continuation probabilities. On the other hand,
with α > 0, the bank can vary {Rt,k}, ∀t = 1, 2 from L and therefore more efficiently encourage the
firm’s truthful reporting for both periods.
Notice βx1k < 1 represents socially inefficient investment because, at each of the two financing
stages, every project has a positive social value (μk − F > 0, ∀k). The following Proposition
describes, as the scrutiny of financial reporting increases, how the bank addresses the cash-diversion
problem.
Proposition 1 Suppose the bank has assigned a project k ∈ {s, r}. For all α ∈ [0, 1), there exists
an optimal contract, Ck(α), for the bank’s problem, Pk(α), in which all (TTt,↓) binding ∀t = 1, 2,
xt > x̂t. In this case, there is a threshold F k(α) such that the bank offers the contract if and only























(i) ∀α ∈ [0, αk1) :







< 1, βHk = 1,
RL1,k = L, R
M
1,k = M, R
H
1,k = μ
k + α(H − μk),
Rx1x22,k = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x1, x2,








, βMk = β
H
k = 1,
21Recall the direct revelation mechanism is optimal for the bank. In other words, in the benchmark setting, the
optimal way of addressing the cash-diversion problem is inducing the firm to report truthfully.
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RL1,k = L, R
M
1,k = M, R
H
1,k = M + αΔ
HM ,
Rx1x22,k = L + αΔ
x2,L, ∀x1, x2,
(iii) ∀α ∈ [αk2 , 1) :
βx1k = 1, ∀x1,
Rx11,k = L + αΔ
x1L, ∀x1,
Rx1x22,k = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x1, x2.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
If financial reporting scrutiny is not intense (case (i) and (ii)), the bank uses socially inefficient
loan rationing to protect itself from the firm’s cash-diverting behavior. On the other hand, when
the firm’s incentive to manipulate is sufficiently attenuated by enhanced financial reporting scrutiny
(case (iii)), the bank always guarantees the second loan.
With a small manipulation cost (case (i)), the bank actively uses loan rationing to discipline




k = 1. In particular, the bank
cuts off the second loan for a low report (termination threat: βLk = 0). By decreasing β
L
k , the bank
not only extracts more surplus during the first period but also reduces its second-period loss. To















= αΔx1L + (βx1k − β
L
k )(1 − α)(μ
k − L), x1 = M,H (TT
x1L
1 ) (1.2)
From (1.2), the term (1−α)(μk −L) represents the firm’s expected payoff in the second-period
given it has successfully borrowed then.23 By reporting L rather than x1 > L, the firm decreases
the probability it receives this expected payoff. Therefore, a marginal reduction in βLk decreases by
(1−α)(μk−L) the value of reporting L for the firm. Hence, the bank can increase by (1−α)(μk−L)
22The binding (TT HL2,x1) and (TT
HL
1 ) are artifacts of the linear cost. If it is convex, both constraints become slack
but other binding constraints remain the same, and therefore the essential message of the paper is not affected. In
section 4, I will show that both (TT HL2,x1) and (TT
HL
1 ) are slack even with the linear cost.





2,k = (1 − α)(μ
k − L), ∀x1.
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the amount it charges for a report x1 > L. Consider the bank’s second-period expected payoff,
denoted V kt=2.
24
Figure 1.1: The bank’s second-period expected payoff, V kt=2
From figure 1.1, with small α < αkpost, the bank bears a loss during the second period since the
firm has significant leeway in manipulating its reports. As a result, the bank wants to decrease βLk .
On the other hand, the bank wants to increase both βHk and β
M
k since the amount the bank can
extract, via RM1,k and R
H
1,k (equation (1.2)), dominates the second-period loss (i.e., (1 − α)(μ
k −
L) + (L + α(μk − L) − F ) = μk − F > 0).25
However, the bank guarantees the second loan only for H > μk report (i.e., βHk = 1 but
βMk < 1) with charging R
H
1,k < H . Bearing a loss by continuing the second loan, the bank uses
the termination threat (βLk = 0) and increases β
M
k only up to which R
M
1,k becomes M (i.e., β
M
k is
increasing in M < μk). Note, with α ∈ (αkpost, α
k
1), the bank still uses the termination threat since
the amount the bank extracts in the first period outweighs the opportunity cost of the foregone
second-period gain (figure 1.1).26





2,k = L + α(μ
k − L) − F , ∀x1.
25One would question increasing βMk may increase the firm’s incentive to manipulate from H to M report. To see




HM + (βHk − β
M
k )(1 − α)(μ
k − L), (TT HM1 ) (∗)
βMk does not effect (TT
HM
1 ) since both the left-hand side and right-hand side are equally reduced.
26The termination threat is renegotiation proof only when α < αkpost (i.e., for any α > α
k
post, after L report,
the bank would switch to βLk = 1, and the firm would take this mutual beneficial offer). As mentioned in Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990), this is one of the main differences between their model and Townsend (1979), in which the
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On the other hand, with an intermediate manipulation cost (case (ii)), the bank uses relatively
less rationing: βHk = β
M
k = 1 but β
L
k > 0. The bank now has less incentive to use the termina-
tion threat since its second-period gain is sufficiently large. Overall, consistent with Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990), the contract Ck(α) in both case (i) and (ii) resembles a debt contract: the bank
addresses the cash-diversion problem mainly through loan rationing (staged financing) that results
in socially inefficient investment.
With sufficiently enhanced financial reporting scrutiny (case (iii)), the bank stops using the
loan rationing: βx1k = 1, ∀x1. The bank no longer needs loan rationing since the leeway for the firm
to manipulate its reports is sufficiently pressed. As a result, the form of Ck(α) is no longer a debt
contract.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the optimal contract in Proposition 1 is not unique.





satisfying truthtelling constraints.27 That is, the bank has a degree of freedom in Ck(α). In this
benchmark setting, having only the cash-diversion problem, I pick the contract Ck(α) that has the
bank maximizing its second-period payoff. This degree of freedom will play an important role in
section 1.4, which allows for the asset substitution.
One of the main goals in this paper is to study the effect of changes in α (reporting scrutiny)
on financing arrangement and especially on the continuation probabilities as the key measure of
investment efficiency. The following Corollary illustrates this issue when the project choice is
contractible.




inspection threat (costly state verification) is not ex post credible. The low cash flow, L, can be interpreted as the
market value of the collateral asset. In this case, the support of outcome is {0, M, H}, as in Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997). Therefore RL1,k = L with β
L
k = 0 is equivalent to liquidating the firm.
27This non-uniqueness is consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Technically, RH1,k in equation (1.2) is the
result of plugging {RHx22,k } from (1.1) into R
H
1,k = L + αΔ





2,k )) − β
L
k ∙ (1 − α)(μ
k − L).
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Figure 1.2: βx1k with the contractible project choice
The bank weakly increases its future lending as α increases (figure 1.2).28 Consistent with
conventional wisdom, enhanced scrutiny of financial reporting increases investment efficiencies,
since the bank is better protected from the firm diverting cash.
Figure 1.3: The total surplus, the bank’s and firm’s utility (contractible project choice).
Overall, from figure 1.3, increased financial reporting scrutiny makes the bank commit to more




= 0, ∀α ∈ [0, αk1). If the manipulation cost is quadratic, then
∂βMk
∂α
> 0. One of the goals in this paper
is to compare the optimal contracts with and without asset substitution. In section 1.4, I show ∂β
M
∂α
< 0 even if the
cost is linear. That is, convex cost simply sharpens the comparison of two settings.
29At each threshold αk1 and α
k
2 , the bank switches its equilibrium strategy in terms of {β
x1
k }, which leads to discrete
jumps of the total surplus and the firm’s utility.
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1.4 Optimal Contract With an Asset-Substitution Problem
In section 1.3, I investigated how the marginal manipulation cost, α, affects the (contractible)
benchmark contract, Ck(α). However, Ck(α) remains as optimal only when the bank can prescribe
the project choice from the start.30 If the project choice is not contractible and therefore the firm
can choose a project k ∈ {s, r} after the bank offers the initial loan, the door for ex post risk-shifting
(asset-substitution) is opened. Denote the optimal contract with noncontractible project choice by
CAS(α).









Firm observes x1 and
reports x̂1. Payoffs at
t = 1 are determined.
Bank lends second F




Payoffs at t = 2
are determined.
Timeline II – Noncontractible Project Choice.
1.4.1 The conflict of interest between the bank and the firm (the asset-
substitution area)
I first investigate when the parties have a conflict of interest in terms of the project choice (i.e.,
amount of risk to take) given the benchmark contract Ck(α). Note that, if there is no disagreement
over the project choice, then among Ck(α), k ∈ {s, r}, the one with larger bank’s utility, denoted
V k(Ck(α)), is the optimal contract (i.e., CAS(α) = Cs(α) if and only if V s(Cs(α)) > V r(Cr(α))).31
On the other hand, if there is a conflict of interest in terms of the project choice, a project choice
constraint must be added to the previous bank’s problem, Pk(α). In other words, the bank has to
address not only the cash-diversion problem but also an asset-substitution problem. After adding
30The results in Proposition 1 are not affected by the distribution of cash flow {pkxt}. Assumption 2 is just a
reduced form to illustrate the asset-substitution problem in a parsimonious manner.
31Ck(α) is the optimal contract for the bank with a project k. Therefore, if the bank prefers a particular project k
and the firm chooses the project with the contract Ck(α), then there is no disagreement over the project choice.
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a project choice constraint, again, I need to check whether truthful reporting is still optimal for the
bank.
From Assumption 2, given η > 0, “the asset-substitution area” is the area of (α, ε) in which the
firm’s preference is different from that of the bank. To establish such an asset-substitution area
exists, first I need to verify the firm’s preference over the projects given the benchmark contract
Ck(α). Denote the ε-threshold at which μr(ε) = μs by εFB and the firm’s preference over the project
choice by kf (α, ε) ∈ {s, r}. Also, define the first-best project choice preference by kFB(α, ε) such
that kFB(α, ε) = r if and only if ε > εFB .
Recall the firm’s first-period payoff under Ck(α) takes the form of a call option. Following
Jensen and Meckling (1976), debt financing literature has mainly focused on this convex payoff of
the borrower. As an analogue to this model, the literature has expected that the borrower will
choose the risky project even if μr < μs. The following Lemma, however, shows that this intuition
is incomplete.
Lemma 1 The firm’s preference over the project choice for given Ck(α).
∀α, ∀ε, suppose the bank has offered the contract Ck(α), ∀k ∈ {s, r}. Then, we have following:
kf (α, ε) = kFB(α, ε),
i.e., the firm’s induced preference over the project choice is the first-best.
Lemma 1 indicates, under the benchmark contract Ck(α), the firm chooses the risky project if
and only if μr > μs. The key is the firm’s first-period payoff is convex, while at the same time its
second-period payoff, combined with the continuation probabilities, is concave. To see this in more
detail, consider following special case of Ck(α) with α = 0.32
Figure 1.4 (a) illustrates the firm’s first- and second-period expected payoffs under the bench-
mark contract Ck(0) when it has chosen a project k. Recall, the bank uses the loan-continuation
probabilities to discipline the firm’s incentive to manipulate its reports downward. As a result,
βx1k resembles a put option, with strike price μ
k, which in turn determines the repayment to the
bank, Rx11,k, and the firm’s second-period expected payoff, β
x1
k (μ
k − L), as concave.33 Accordingly,
32From Assumption 1, M ∈ (L, μk) and H > μk.





is increasing in M and, with H > μk, βHk = 1.
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(a) The firm’s payoffs (b) The bank’s payoffs
Figure 1.4: First- and second-period payoffs for both parties given x1 report (α = 0)
it determines the firm’s first-period payoff, x1 − R
x1
1,k, as a call option with the same strike price.
Thus, the combination of call and put options – overall linear payoff – narrows down the firm’s
focus to compare the expected value of each project.34
On the other hand, figure 4 (b) shows the bank’s overall payoff under Ck(α) is concave. To see











−F ) = L + βx1k ∙ (μ
k − F ), ∀x1 ∈ X. (1.3)
From (1.3), the bank’s overall payoff, with βx1k taking the form of put option, is concave, mainly
driven by its first-period repayments. Thus one would expect that the bank is biased in favor of the
safe project. To assess the bank’s preference over the projects, denote ε-threshold above which the
bank starts to prefer the risky project by εb(α) and the corresponding preference over the project
choice by kb(α, ε) ∈ {s, r}.
34In particular, Ck(0) is designed to cut off the second loan for x1 = L report, βLk = 0. Since η > 0, with choosing
the risky one, the firm will more likely lose the second loan than if it had chosen the safe one instead. Thus the
termination threat forces the firm to consider the downside risk of the risky project.
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Lemma 2 The bank’s preference over the project choice, kb(α, ε).
Suppose the bank can directly prescribe a project at date 0. The following describes the bank’s
preference:
(i) With ε < εFB, kb(α, ε) = s for all α ∈ [0, 1),
(ii) With ε ≥ εFB,




kb(α, ε) = s, ∀ε ∈ (εFB , εb(α)]
kb(α, ε) = r, ∀ε > εb(α)
,
where εb(α) > εFB and limα→αs2 ε
b(α) = εFB,
(ii-b) If α ∈ [αs2, 1), ε
b(α) = εFB i.e., kb(α, ε) = r for all ε ≥ εFB.
Lemma 2 shows that the bank is biased toward the safe project. Specifically, if μs > μr
(ε < εFB), the bank always prefers the safe project (case (i)). But as case (ii-a) shows, the bank
continues to prefer the safe project even when it is moderately less profitable than the risky one, if
at the same time the misreporting cost is not too high.35
Lemma 2 also illustrates that the bank’s excessive risk avoidance is moderated by α. As the
amount that the bank can extract from each project gets closer to the total surplus, its preference
over the projects converges to comparing μr and μs. Eventually, with sufficiently large α (case
(ii-b)), the bank’s preference over the project choice becomes the first-best (i.e., εb(α) = εFB).
From Lemma 1 and 2, with α ≥ αs2, both parties have the first-best preference over the project
choice, and therefore there is no disagreement. On the other hand, the following observation
identifies the area of (α, ε) in which, given the benchmark contract, the parties have a conflict of
interest in terms of the project choice.
Observation 1 The asset-substitution area given the benchmark contract is as follows:
∀α ∈ [0, αs2), ∃ε ∈ (ε
FB , εb(α)) such that kb(α, ε) = s but kf (α, ε) = r;
i.e., in this area, the bank prefers the safe project while, if it offers Cs(α), the firm chooses the risky
project.
35One may interpret kb(∙) as an equilibrium project choice in the (contractible) benchmark setting.
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To understand the key of Observation 1, it is useful to focus on the range of the asset-substitution
area, (εFB , εb(α)).36 Observation 1 suggests that the bank will potentially induce, through a con-
tract, the firm to take a socially inefficient level of risk. In other words, it illustrates the area of
(α, ε) in which the bank would offer a contract that is designed to make the firm choose the safe
one even if it has lower expected value than the risky one.37
At this point, it is worth recalling the degree of freedom in the benchmark contract, Cs(α).
Specifically, since βHs = 1 and R
H
1,s < H , the bank is indifferent between any split of the repayments,
RH1,s and {R
Hx2
2,s }, satisfying truthtelling constraints. Thus, when asset-substitution is a concern,
one would expect that the bank uses these repayments for inducing the firm to choose the safe
project. To confirm such a cost-free area exists, the following project choice constraint needs to be
added on Ps(α) in section 1.3.1:
U s(∙) ≥ U r(∙), (AS)
where Uk(∙) represents the firm’s expected utility when it chooses a project k and (AS) is short
for the asset-substitution. Denote ε-threshold up to which the bank can satisfy (AS) at no cost by
εCF (α) (i.e., an upper bound of the cost-free asset-substitution area).
Lemma 3 The cost-free asset-substitution area.
∀F > F , ∃εCF (α) such that ∀ε ∈ [εFB , εCF (α)), the bank can satisfy (AS) at no cost by simply
reshuffling RH1,s and {R
Hx2
2,s }. All other terms remain the same as in C
s(α).
εCF (α) has following characteristics: εCF (0) = εFB, ∂ε
CF (α)
∂α ≥ 0 almost everywhere, and there
exists α∗ < αs1 such that ∀α < α
∗, εCF (α) < εb(α) and vice versa. i.e., ∀α > α∗, the entire
asset-substitution area becomes the cost-free asset-substitution area.
36For α < αs2, when ε < ε
FB (μr < μs), both parties prefer the safe project (i.e., the bank offers the contract Cs(α)
and the firm chooses the safe one). From Lemma 2, when ε > εb(α) (μr  μs), even the bank starts to prefer the
risky project (i.e., the bank offers Cr(α) and the firm chooses the risky one).
37The literature has been silent on this excessive preference of lenders on the safe project but instead focused on
controlling excessive risk-taking by borrowers. Brander and Poitevin (1992) and John and John (1993) studied an
optimal compensation structure that mitigates firms’ excessive risk-taking. Diamond (1989, 1991) showed that a
desire to build reputation can motivate firms to borrow from banks for the purpose of certification and monitoring,
reducing incentives to take excessive risk. Overall, the literature has focused on aligning the borrowers’ risk-taking
incentive to that of the lenders’ through contracts.
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Lemma 3 shows, in the asset-substitution area, there exists a region where the bank can induce
the firm to choose the safe project at no cost. To see this, from the project choice constraint (AS),










































From (1.4), any change in {RHx22,s } has an impact on the project choice constraint purely through
the second-period likelihood ratio, (prx2 − p
s
x2). This is because any change in {R
Hx2
2,s }, combined
with {psx2}, is offset by R
H
1,s.
38 Therefore the bank enhances the firm’s safe project-choice incentive
by maximizing prH(ε + η)(M − R
HM




2,s ). The key is the extent to
which the bank can control the firm’s risk-taking via {RHx22,s } is increased by α. Consider following



















From (1.5) and (1.6), increased α affords the bank more leeway for choosing RHH2,s (upper bound)
and RHM2,s (lower bound). In particular, the bank reduces R
HM
2,s because increased manipulation cost
deters the firm from misreporting to M when it observes L or H at t = 2. That is, the bank uses
the repayments {RHx22,s } for controlling the firm’s risk-taking, rather than extracting surplus, at no
cost (i.e., (AS) is slack).40 Accordingly, the cost-free area keeps expanding in α and, after certain
38From Cs(α), RH1,s = L + αΔ





2,s ) − β
L
s ∙ (1 − α)(μ
s − L). Notice that RH1,s perfectly
absorbs a change in {RHx22,s }, conditional on the safe project choice (i.e., the second-period distribution is {p
s
x2}). Thus,








2,s ), which captures the amount that has not absorbed by R
H
1,s.
39These constraints prevent the firm from manipulating upward and downward at date 2.
40Technically, in Observation 1, this area was classified as the asset-substitution area because the benchmark
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point, the entire asset-substitution area becomes the cost-free area (i.e., ∀α > α∗, εCF (α) > εb(α)).
Figure 1.5: The costly and cost-free areas for all α ∈ [0, α∗).
Finally, to study the optimal contract with the asset-substitution problem, in addition to the
cash-diversion problem, it is useful to introduce the following:
Definition 1 The costly asset-substitution area: α ∈ [0, α∗), ε ∈ (εCF (α), εb(α)).
Definition 1 rules out extreme α and ε so that both the cash-diversion and asset-substitution
problems matter (figure 1.5). In particular, it ensures that the bank has to pay agency rent for
inducing the firm to choose the safe project (i.e., socially inefficient level of risk).
contract Cs(α) has the lender maximizing his second-period payoff, i.e., RHx22,s = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x2. The reason for
picking this particular contract in the benchmark setting is because, when the cash-diversion problem is the only
agency problem, there is no reason for the lender to use {RHx22,s } for controlling the firm’s risk-taking. In addition, by
comparing this benchmark to the contract in Lemma 3, I can articulate the role and impact of the degree of freedom
in Cs(α) when the asset-substitution is a concern.
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1.4.2 Optimal contract with the asset-substitution problem
The next natural question is which project will the bank incentivize the firm to choose in the costly
asset-substitution area. To address this question, I first derive an optimal contract for the bank,
conditional on its inducing the firm to choose the safe project in the entire costly asset-substitution
area. Denote the bank’s problem as P̂s(α) and the corresponding contract as Ĉs(α). Second, to
investigate whether the bank indeed decides to incentivize the firm to choose the safe project in
the entire costly asset-substitution area, I compare the following two utilities: the bank’s expected
utility with the contract Ĉs(α), denoted V s(Ĉs(α)), and its expected utility with the contract Cr(α),
V r(Cr(α)).41 As previously discussed, in the costly asset-substitution area, if the bank prefers the
risky one with the benchmark contract Cr(α), so does the firm (Lemma 1).42 Therefore the optimal





Ĉs(α) and kAS = s, if V s(Ĉs(α)) > V r(Cr(α)),
Cr(α) and kAS = r, if V s(Ĉs(α)) < V r(Cr(α)).
Suppose the bank wants to incentivize the firm to choose the safe project in the entire costly
asset-substitution area. Again, the project choice constraint (AS) needs to be added on Ps(α) in
section 1.3.1 to describe P̂s(α), and as I show in Appendix B, truthtelling equilibrium is optimal
for the bank. Thus we can restrict our attention to the bank’s problem, P̂s(α), with truthtelling


















































2 , ∀x1, ∀x2, x
′
2, (TT2)
41If the bank does not decide to incentivize the firm to choose the safe project in the entire costly area, this
comparison will derive a threshold of ε above which the bank starts to let the firm choose the risky project.
42Recall, Cr(α) is the optimal contract for the bank given the project choice, k = r.
CHAPTER 1. EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND ASSET SUBSTITUTION: REAL











































2,s )] ≥ 0, (IR)
with limited liability constraints
(LLx11 ) : R̂
x1
1,s ≤ x1, (LL
x1x2
2 ) : R̂
x1x2
2,s ≤ x1 − R̂
x1





At this point, it is useful to compare two different bank’s problems, P̂s(α) and Ps(α) (i.e., with
and without the asset-substitution problem), to understand a link between the asset-substitution
and the cash-diversion problem.43
In Ps(α), since the bank can directly prescribe the project choice, its sole focus is to address
the cash-diversion problem. Therefore the bank uses {βx1s } only for mitigating the firm’s incentive
to manipulate its reports downward: the higher the first period report, the higher the continuation
probability. In that setting, as α increases, the bank weakly increases {βx1s } (Corollary 1).
On the other hand, in P̂s(α), the bank uses {β̂x1s } to tackle both the cash-diversion and the
asset-substitution problems. A key intuition is that there is a tradeoff between combatting these
two problems with using {β̂x1s }. For instance, increasing β̂
M
s encourages the firm to choose the safe






s ) but also increases
the firm’s incentive to manipulate from H to M report at t = 1.44 That is, the asset-substitution
and cash-diversion problems are inter-connected, through the continuation probabilities and re-
payments. Thus, a priori, it is not clear whether the bank still increases the loan-continuation
probabilities as α increases.
Following Lemma 3, ∀F > F , denote the maximum required investment until which the bank
would lend in P̂s(α) by FAS(α). The following Proposition describes the optimal contract, CAS(α),
43Note, in both problems, the safe project will be implemented. In the problem Ps(α) (P̂s(α)), by directly
prescribing the safe project choice (by satisfying the project choice constraint (AS)), the bank can make the firm to
implement the safe project.
44Likewise, increasing β̂Hs enhances the firm’s incentive to report H truthfully while at the same time increasing
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including the project choice that the bank induces the firm to make, kAS(∙), when both the asset-
substitution and the cash-diversion problems matter.
Proposition 2 Suppose α ∈ [0, α∗) and ε ∈ (εCF (α), εb(α)). Then ∀F ∈ (F, FAS(α)), CAS(α) is
as follows: ∀α ∈ [0, α∗), there exists εAS(α) ∈ (εCF (α), εb(α)) such that
(i) Area A: ∀ε ∈ (εAS(α), εb(α)], CAS(α) = Cr(α) and kAS(α, ε) = r.
(ii) Area B: ∀ε ∈ (εCF (α), εAS(α)], CAS(α) = Ĉs(α) and kAS(α, ε) = s.
The contract Ĉs(α) has following features: the project choice constraint (AS) is binding and,
among (TT1), only (TTHM1 ) is binding.










HM , R̂x1M2,s = L − αΔ
ML, R̂x1L1,s = L, x1 = H,L,
R̂H1,s = M + αΔ
HM + (1 − β̂Ms )(1 − α)(μ




All other contract terms in Ĉs(α) remain the same as in Cs(α).
Figure 1.6: Sub-areas of the asset-substitution area for all α ∈ [0, α∗).
Proposition 2 shows that the bank does not incentivize the firm to choose the safe project in
the entire costly (asset-substitution) area. Specifically, with sufficiently high ε > εAS(α) (area A in
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figure 1.6), the firm’s willingness to choose the risky project is so pronounced that the bank would
have to pay large agency rent for inducing it to choose the safe project.45 As a result, the bank
gives up on (AS) and lets the firm choose the risky project offering the contract Cr(α). On the
other hand, when ε < εAS(α) (area B), the bank decides to incentivize the firm to choose the safe
project, offering Ĉs(α), since the firm’s preference for the risky one is “small.”
From Lemma 3, when ε is sufficiently small (cost-free area), the bank can induce the firm to
choose the safe project, by simply reshuffling R̂H1,s and {R̂
Hx2
2,s }, at no cost. On the other hand,
when ε is intermediate (area B), reshuffling of the repayments is no longer sufficient. A key change
in Ĉs(α), compared to the cost-free area, is that the bank has increased β̂Ms from β
M
s to enhance the
firm’s safe project-choice incentive.46 In other words, compared to the (contractible) benchmark
level, the bank offers a higher continuation probability for M report, which is a signal of a safe
project choice. As a result, the bank pays agency rent in terms of reduced R̂H1,s since decreasing
β̂Hs − β̂
M
s exacerbates the firm’s incentive to report H truthfully; i.e., the bank addresses the
asset-substitution problem at the expense of exacerbating the cash-diversion problem.
At this point, it is useful to compare the results from two problems, P̂s(α) and Ps(α), to
observe the impact of the asset-substitution problem on both investment efficiency and the firm’s
risk-taking. Starting from Jensen and Meckling (1976), the literature has expected that the asset-
substitution problem, as a capital market friction, restricts financing from lenders to firms. The
following Observation, however, shows that this intuition is incomplete when there is another
friction, the cash-diversion problem.
Observation 2 P̂s(α) vs. Ps(α)
Given α < α∗ and F ∈ [F , FAS(α)], following holds in the costly asset-substitution area:
(i) β̂Hs = β
H









(ii) εAS(α) < εb(α).
Observation 2 shows that the emergence of the asset-substitution problem, instead of com-
pounding the existing inefficiencies from the cash-diversion problem, leads to improved investment






, for all α ≤ αs1, in C
s(α) from Proposition 1.
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efficiency and more socially efficient risk-taking. As previously discussed, in P̂s(α), the bank of-
fers higher access to future capital for a medium report than the benchmark level ( β̂Ms > β
M
s ),
holding other probabilities fixed, as a way to address the asset-substitution problem. That is,
the bank raises its lending, which in turn leads to increased total surplus. Also, compared to the
(contractible) benchmark setting, the bank lets the firm take some additional (socially efficient)
risk (area B: εAS(α) < εb(α)), since now the bank has to pay agency rent for controlling the firm’s
risk-taking in a socially sub-optimal manner.47
One natural follow-up question is whether the area of (α, ε) that the bank imposes, through the
contract, socially inefficient risk-taking becomes larger as α increases. To see this, denote the cost-
free asset-substitution area in Lemma 3 by Area C and define Ωj(α) ≡ meas{ε
∣
∣(α, ε) ∈ Area j
∣
∣α},
j = A,B,C. Then the following Corollary describes the equilibrium firm’s project choice in the
entire asset-substitution area, which includes both costly and cost-free areas (Observation 1).
Corollary 2 Suppose α ∈ [0, αs2) and ε ∈ [ε
FB , εb(α)). i.e., in the asset-substitution area from
Observation 1. Then, we have the following:
(i) ∀α < α∗, ΩA(α) and ΩB(α) are decreasing in α.
But ΩC(α) and ΩB(α) + ΩC(α) are increasing in α.
(ii) ∀α > α∗, ΩC(α) converges to 0 as α → αs2.
Corollary 2 indicates, when manipulation cost is small (case (i)), an increase in the latter
exacerbates the bank’s propensity to impose its risk-avoiding preference on the firm. The key is
that the increased manipulation cost not only relaxes the cash-diversion problem but also indirectly
relaxes the asset-substitution problem. This is because, as previously discussed in Lemma 3, the
bank can better control the firm’s risk-taking through reshuffling R̂H1,s and {R̂
Hx2
2,s }; i.e., area C
in figure 1.6 (cost-free area) expands. Therefore, being biased in favor of safety, the bank more
aggressively pushes the firm to choose the safe project by way of contract design. As a result, the
sum of area C and area B (costly area), which is the total area that the bank restrains the firm’s
risk-taking in a socially suboptimal manner, becomes larger in α.
47From Lemma 3, after α∗, the entire asset-substitution area is the cost-free area (i.e., εb(α) < εCF (α)). That is,
for all α > α∗, β̂x1s = β
x1
s , ∀x1 ∈ X and ε
AS(α) = εb(α). In other words, ∀α > 0, the results in Observation 2 hold
in a weak-inequality sense.
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On the other hand, after α∗ (case (ii)), this tendency starts to diminish. Recall from Lemma
3, now the bank can fully restrain the firm’s risk-taking simply through reshuffling the repayments,
R̂H1,s and {R̂
Hx2
2,s }; i.e., the entire asset-substitution area becomes the cost-free area (area C). In
addition, from Lemma 2, as the amount the bank can extract from each project approaches the
total surplus by increased α, its focus converges to comparing μr and μs. In other words, the
entire asset-substitution area is shrinking since the bank’s bias for the safe project is mitigated. 48
Therefore, as α increases, although the bank can better induce the firm’s inefficient risk-taking, the
bank’s preference over the projects converges to the first-best.
Finally, one of the main goals of this paper is to study the impact of changes in the scrutiny of
financial reporting, captured by α, on the optimal contract with and without the asset-substitution
problem. Especially among the contract terms, the key is comparing the impact of α on {βx1s }
and {β̂x1s } because the continuation probabilities proxy for investment efficiency. The following
Corollary describes how {β̂x1s } responses to increased α in the asset-substitution area.
Corollary 3 Given ε < εCF (α∗), there exist α(ε) and ᾱ(ε) such that, ∀α ∈ [α, ᾱ],
(i) β̂Hs = β
H
s .





(ii-b) ∀α ∈ [αCF (ε), ᾱ], β̂Ms = β
M
s .
(iii) β̂Ls = β
L
s .
where αCF (ε) is the inverse function of εCF (α), ∀α ≤ α∗.
Contrary to the (contractible) benchmark, Corollary 3 illustrates the impact of enhanced finan-
cial reporting scrutiny on investment efficiency is nonmonotonic (U-shaped). In particular, with
small α < αCF (ε) (area B), the bank is committing to more loan rationing as α increases. Specifi-
cally, holding other probabilities fixed, the bank reduces the continuation probability for M report,
β̂Ms , so that the investment efficiency decreases (figure 1.7 (b)).
48From Lemma 2, the upper bound of the asset-substitution area εb(α) converges to εFB as α increases.
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(a) β̂Hs (b) β̂Ms (c) β̂Ls
Figure 1.7: β̂x1s with the noncontractible project choice
At first glance, it seems counter-intuitive since a medium report is a signal of a safe project
choice. In area B (α < αCF (ε)), the bank pays incremental agency rent by offering higher continu-
ation probability for M report than the benchmark level. Again, the increased manipulation cost
affords the bank more leeway for reshuffling R̂H1,s and {R̂
H,x2
2,s }, thereby enables the bank to relax
(AS) to a larger extent at no cost (Lemma 3). Thus, the bank decreases β̂Ms by the amount (AS)
is relaxed, which in turn increases R̂H1,s.
49 In other words, the bank more actively uses the loan
rationing to protect itself from the firm’s cash-diverting behavior, decreasing the continuation prob-
ability for a medium report toward to the benchmark level (i.e., investment efficiency decreases).
That is, as α increases, the bank relies more on the continuation probabilities (the repayments
R̂H1,s and {R̂
H,x2
2,s }) for addressing the first period cash-diversion problem (the asset-substitution
problem).
On the other hand, with a sufficiently large manipulation cost, the bank can effectively control
the firm’s risk-taking simply through the prescribed repayments (area C: α > αCF (ε)). Since as-
set substitution is no longer a concern, the bank uses the loan-continuation probabilities only for
addressing the cash-diversion problem as in the (contractible) benchmark. Then, as the further in-
crease in reporting scrutiny provides even better protection from the firm’s cash-diverting behavior,
the bank weakly increases its future lending (i.e., investment efficiency increases).
49Holding β̂x1s (especially β̂
M




















ML > 0. (1.7)
Therefore the bank decreases β̂Ms and reduces the agency rents (decreasing β̂
M
s disciplines the firm’s incentive to
manipulate its report from H to M at t = 1, and therefore the bank can increase R̂H1,s).
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Figure 1.8: The total surplus, the bank’s and firm’s utility: noncontractible project choice (in the
asset-substitution area).
Conventional wisdom has predicted enhanced scrutiny of financial reporting would lead lenders
to raise their financing of profitable firms. Corollary 1 shows that this is true if the cash-diversion
problem is the only capital market friction. Corollary 2 and 3 show, however, given the cash-
diversion problem, if the asset-substitution problem is also a concern, enhanced financial reporting
scrutiny may have an adverse effect on both the investment efficiency and the firm’s risk-taking
because these frictions are inter-connected.
A lot of regulations (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) concerning corporate financial reporting
are designed mainly focusing on equity markets. In general, these regulations are introduced to
raise funding in equity markets by restricting corporate misreporting. However, the results in this
paper suggest that such regulations may have unintended spillover effects on private debt markets
because those financial accounting reports are also used in debt contracting. That is, in response
to such regulations, banks would offer debt contracting that is designed to maximize their own
utilities not the total surplus, and therefore we may observe negative real effects from a social
welfare perspective.
1.5 Conclusion
Regulators and researchers have been increasingly interested in, and concerned about, firms’ earn-
ings manipulation. This paper studies an impact of enhanced financial reporting scrutiny on
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banking loan markets considering two capital market frictions: a cash-diversion problem and an
asset-substitution problem. More precisely, assuming a bank (lender) has a bargaining power, the
model has investigated how a bank responds through an optimal contract when a firm (borrower)’s
manipulation behavior becomes more costly.
Four aspects of the equilibrium debt contract are investigated. First, the cash-diversion and
the asset-substitution problems are endogenously linked: to address the cash-diversion problem, an
optimal contract resembles a debt contract, which in turn causes the asset-substitution problem.
In my two-period setting, by using the prospect of future lending, the bank could achieve socially
efficient risk-taking. However, being biased in favor of safety, mainly driven by its concave payoff
(standard debt), the bank offers a contract that is designed to make the firm choose the safe project
even if is less profitable than the risky one.
Second, by comparing with the contractible benchmark, I show integrating the asset-substitution
problem with the existing cash-diversion problem leads to increased investment efficiency and more
socially efficient risk-taking; i.e., given one capital market friction, adding another friction leads to
improved social welfare. The bank addresses the cash-diversion problem by using socially inefficient
loan rationing but to a lesser extent than in the (contractible) benchmark. Specifically, for a
medium report, the bank offers a higher loan-continuation probability than the benchmark level as
a way to induce the firm to choose the safe project while not adjusting the other loan-continuation
probabilities. In other words, the bank raises its lending, which in turn increases the social surplus.
Moreover, compared to the (contractible) benchmark setting, the bank lets the firm take some
additional (socially efficient) risk to avoid the agency rents necessary to fully restrain the firm’s
risk-taking.
Third, as enhanced scrutiny of financial reporting mitigates the cash-diversion problem, the
bank may commit to more strategic loan rationing instead of increasing its lending. As the in-
creased manipulation cost affords the bank more leeway to differentiate repayment amounts for
each report, the bank can better control the firm’s risk-taking by way of contract design. With
small manipulation cost, as it becomes more costly, the bank more relies on the repayments (the
continuation probabilities) for addressing the asset-substitution problem (the cash-diversion prob-
lem). As a result, the bank reduces the continuation probability for a medium report toward the
benchmark level. When it is large, the bank can effectively control the firm’s risk-shifting simply
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through differentiating the repayment amounts, and therefore uses the loan continuation probabil-
ities only for addressing the cash-diversion problem. Thus, as increased manipulation cost further
relaxes the cash-diversion problem, the bank weakly increases the continuation probabilities.
Fourth, the impact of enhanced financial reporting scrutiny on the firm’s risk-taking also is
nonmonotonic. With a small manipulation cost, since the firm’s manipulation incentive is not
sufficiently mitigated (i.e., the cash-diversion problem persists), the optimal contract resembles a
debt contract, which in turn makes the bank biased toward the safe project. Therefore, as the bank
can better control the firm’s risk-taking through differentiating the repayment amounts, the bank
more aggressively pushes the firm to choose the safe project. In contrast, with a sufficiently large
manipulation cost, as the amount that the bank can extract from each project approaches the total
surplus, the bank’s preference over the projects converges to the socially efficient one. Therefore
the bank eventually induces the firm to take a socially efficient level of risk.
Throughout the paper, I assume that bargaining power is delegated to the lender. The assump-
tion that the investor (lender), rather than the borrower (firm), has all bargaining power may seem
unrealistic, particularly for public debt or equity markets. However, young firms or even old firms
that have to borrow from banks are less likely to have bargaining power, especially when firms
are financially constrained and need external funding to sustain their business. In reality, both
cases co-exist. If many results in this paper are qualitatively affected by changing this assumption,
then the essential message from this paper becomes, when regulators or policy makers consider
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Appendix A
Proofs for Optimal Contract with
Truthful Reporting
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To calculate the optimal contract for the bank’s problem Pk(α), I first solve a relaxed program,
which is omitting (TT1,↑) (i.e., x̂1 > x1), and confirm the contract makes the omitted (TT1,↑) slack.





































































































































2,k )] ≥ 0, (IR) (A.10)
with limited liability constraints
(LLx11 ) : R
x1
1,k ≤ x1, (LL
x1x2
2 ) : R
x1x2
2,k ≤ x1 − R
x1
1,k + x2, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.
The proof starts with confirming all truthtelling constraints, (A.7) - (A.9), at date 1 are binding.
Note, among (A.7) - (A.9), if any two of them are binding, then the remaining constraint holds as
equality. Suppose (A.7) is the only binding constraint among (A.7)-(A.9). But then, from (A.8)
and (A.9), by increasing RM1,k by δ, the bank can be strictly better off. Now, suppose (A.9) is
the only binding constraint. But then, from (A.7) and (A.8), by increasing RH1,k by δ, the bank is
strictly better off without violating other truthtelling constraints. Again, suppose (A.8) is the only
binding constraint. But then, the bank can increase both RH1,k and R
M
1,k by δ. Finally, the same
logic can be applied if none of them are binding. Thus, at least two from (A.7)-(A.9) are binding
and therefore every truthtelling constraint at date 1 is binding.
By plugging RH1,k and R
M
1,k from binding (A.7) and (A.9) into the objective function of the bank,
denoted V k(Ck(α)), we have following:
V k(Ck(α)) = −F + RL1,k + α(μ
k − L) + pkHβ
H
k (μ
k − F ) + pkMβ
M
k (μ

























x1 and the multiplier of (LL
x1
1 ) (derived
by plugging (A.7) and (A.9) into (LLH1 ) and (LL
M
1 ), respectively) and (LL
x1x2










k =1 and λβ
x1
k =0, respectively. Then, the Lagrangian is:









) + λIR ∙ (IR) + λx11 ∙ (LL
x1






k =1 ∙ (1 − βx1k ) + λ
β
x1
k =0 ∙ (βx1k − 0)
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1,k ) − λ
β
x1
k =1 + λβ
x1























1,k ) − λ
βLk =1 + λβ
L


































































































































μk−L), the following solution
obtains:
The non-zero Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ
H
k =1 = pkH(μ
k − F ), λβ
L
k =0 = pkH(μ
k − F ) − (L + α(μk −




























and λL1 = 1 − λ
M
1 > 0.







< 1, βLk = 0, R
H
1,k = μ
k + α(H − μk), RM1,k = M ,
RL1,k = L, R
x1x2
2,k = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.










M )(1 − α
k
post), the following solution ob-
tains:
The non-zero Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ
H
k =1 = pkH(μ
k − F ), λβ
M
k =1 = (L + α(μk − L) − F ) −
pkH(μ
































1 = (1 − β
L























M )(1 − λ
M
1 ).
The choice variables : βHk = β
M
k = 1, β
L





, RH1,k = M + αΔ
HM , RM1,k = M , R
L
1,k = L,
Rx1x22,k = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.
case (iii): ∀α ∈ [αk2 , 1), the following solution obtains:
The non-zero Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ
H
k =1 = pkH(μ
k − F ), λβ
M
k =1 = pkM (μ
k − F ), λβ
L
k =1 =
(L + α(μk − L) − F ) − (pkH + p
k
M )(μ

















The choice variables : βx1k = 1, R
x1
1,k = L + αΔ
x1L, ∀x1, R
x1x2
2,k = L + αΔ
x2L, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.



















0 and therefore the bank is indifferent between any division of RH1,k and {R
Hx2
2,k } that satisfies (A.1)
- (A.8) with x1 = H. Finally, for all cases, a straight forward plugging of the solutions into the
omitted (TT1,↑) confirms that they are slack.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
To establish the asset-substitution area, we need to check, for all (α, ε), the firm’s preference over
the project choice given each contract Ck(α), k ∈ {s, r}.





s }. From equation (A.7) - (A.9), under C
s(α), ∀α ∈ [0, 1), the firm does not deviate
from truthtelling for either projects because μr > μs. We now compare the firm’s expected utility
with project k, denoted Uk(Cs(α)), given the contract Cs(α):
1. U s (Cs(α)|α ∈ [0, αs1)) − U




















s (1 − α)(μ
r − μs)







2. U s (Cs(α)|α ∈ [αs1, α
s
2)) − U
r (Cs(α)|α ∈ [αs1, α
s
2))












3. U s (Cs(α)|α ∈ [αs2, 1)) − U
r (Cs(α)|α ∈ [αs2, 1)) = 2(1 − α)(μ
r − μs)
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Thus, ∀α ∈ [0, 1), if ε > εFB(μr > μs) and the bank offers Cs(α), then kf (α, ε) = r.




r }. From equation (A.7) -
(A.9), under Cr(α), ∀α ∈ [0, 1), the firm does not deviate from truthtelling with the risky project.
However, under Cr(α), for all α ∈ [0, αr2), if the firm chooses the safe project it manipulates its
reports from both H and M to L since {βr} is customized for truthtelling only with the risky
project choice (it can be confirmed by plugging Cr(α) into equation (A.7) - (A.9) with k = s and
μr > μs).1 Therefore, for every x1 realization, the firm gets x1 − L − αΔx1L = (1 − α)Δx1L. For
all α ∈ [0, αr1), since β
L
r = 0, if the firm chooses the safe project under the contract C
r(α), its











](1 − α)(μs − L). In contrast, ∀α ∈ [αr2, 1), since β
x1
r = 1, ∀x1, the firm does not
manipulate its reports under Cr(α) with either projects. Thus, we have followings:
1. U s (Cr(α)|α ∈ [0, αr1)) − U
r (Cr(α)|α ∈ [0, αr1))


















= (1 − α)(μs − L) − (1 − α)(μr − L) = (1 − α)(μs − μr)
2. U s (Cr(α)|α ∈ [αr1, α
r
2)) − U








](1 − α)(μs − L) − (1 − α)[(μr − L) + (μr − M)]






3. U s (Cr(α)|α ∈ [αr2, 1)) − U
r (Cr(α)|α ∈ [αr2, 1)) = 2(1 − α)(μ
s − μr)
Thus, ∀α ∈ [0, 1), if ε > εFB(μr > μs) and the bank offers Cr(α), then kf (ε) = r. With a similar
logic, one can confirm that ∀α ∈ [0, 1), if ε < εFB and the bank offers Ck(α), then kf (ε) = s, ∀k.
Overall, ∀α ∈ [0, 1), under the contract Ck(α), ∀k, the firm chooses the risky (safe) project if and
only if ε > εFB (ε < εFB).
1Also, by plugging Cr(α) into omitted truthtelling constraints that prevents to manipulate upward with the




1 ) with k = s), a straightforward calculation confirms that these are slack.
Therefore, no manipulation upward even if the firm chooses the safe project under Cr(α).
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
To see the bank’s preference over the projects, I need to compare its expected utility with both
projects, denoted V k(Ck(α)), k ∈ {s, r}. From Proposition 1, with a straight forward calculation,






2 < 1. Therefore, the first case I consider is
α ∈ [0, αs1). From Proposition 1, we have:
ΔV k(α|α ∈ [0, αs1)) = V
r(Cr(α)|α ∈ [0, αs1)) − V
s(Cs(α)|α ∈ [0, αs1))
















η](μr − M) (A.12)










η (i.e., μr < H), we have:




< 0, ε = εFB







∂ε > 0, ∀ε
Therefore, ∀α ∈ [0, αs1), there exists a unique cutoff, ε
b(α), at which the bank breaks even. That
is, ∀ε ∈ [εFB , εb(α)] (∀ε ∈ (εb(α), 13 − η)), the bank prefers the safe (risky) project. Applying























∂ε − 0 > 0, ∀ε ≥ ε
FB). Therefore, ∀α ∈ [0, αs1), as α
increases, the area of ε for which the bank prefers the safe (risky) project shrinks (grows). Using
similar calculations, in the cases with α ∈ [αs1, α
r




2), one can confirm the cutoff
εb(α) is unique.
Now, consider for α ∈ [αr2, α
s
2). From Proposition 1, we have the following:
ΔV k(α|α ∈ [αr2, α
s
2)) = V
r(Cr(α)|α ∈ [αr2, α
s
2)) − V
s(Cs(α)|α ∈ [αr2, α
s
2))







s − F ) + (1 − α)[2μs − L − M ] (A.13)
Here, we know ,∀ε < εb(αr2), ΔV







we have the following:






< 0 , at α = αr2, ε = ε
FB





∂ε > 0 , ∀ε
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Therefore, ∀α ∈ (αr2, α
s
2), there exists a threshold, ε
b(α) > εFB , above which the bank starts to
prefer the risky project and limα→αs2 ε

























> 0 since εb(α) > εFB).
Finally, from Proposition 1, ∀α ≥ αs2, the bank’s expected utility from either project k ∈ {s, r}
is V k(Ck(α)) = (L+α(μk −L)−F ). Thus, the bank’s preference over the project choice boils down
to comparing μs and μr. i.e., ∀α > αs2, ε
b(α) = εFB .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3 (The Cost-free Asset-Substitution Area)
Figure A.1: The Asset-Substitution Area (Observation 1).
To show existence of the cost-free asset-substitution area, the following constraint (AS) needs










2,s ) (AS) (A.14)
First, recall from Proposition 1, that the bank is indifferent between any division of the repay-
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ments RH1,s and {R
Hx2
2,s }, that satisfy (A.1) - (A.8) with x1 = H, in C
s(α). Therefore, given α, there
is an ε-threshold, denoted εCF (α), up to which the bank can satisfy (AS) at no cost (i.e., (AS) is
slack) keeping other contract terms in Cs(α) the same (i.e., keeping all (TT1,↓) binding). Plugging

















s )(1 − α)(μ
r − μs) ≥ 0, (A.15)
where {βx1s } is specified in C
s(α) for all α. Therefore, the bank’s problem boils down to maximizing






1 ) ((A.7) plugged) and (LL
Hx2
2 ), ∀x2 ∈ X. Then,
the Lagrangian becomes:

















The FOCs for {RHx22,s } are as follows:
∂Ls
∂RHH2,s





















































Then there exists αH1 > α
s
1 such that, ∀α ∈ [0, α
H
1 ), the solution is as follows:







The choice variables : RHH2,s = R
HM
2,s + αΔ
HM , RHM2,s = L − αΔ





L + αΔHL + [(1 − α)(μs − L) + 2(psH + p
s
M )αΔ
ML], α ∈ [0, αs1)
L + αΔHL + [(1 − α)ΔML + 2(psH + p
s
M )αΔ




For all α ∈ [αH1 , α
s
2), the solution is as follows:
















The choice variables : RHH2,s = R
HM
2,s +αΔ






], RHL2,s = L,
RH1,s = H.
Technically, given α, at ε = εCF (α), (A.15) equals 0 with the above solutions. Applying the
implicit function theorem, one can confirm that ∂ε
CF (α)
∂α ≥ 0 almost every where except at α
s
1.




1, by plugging into (A.15), one can confirm there is
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Figure A.2: Cost-free Asset-Substitution Area.
a discrete jump down of εCF (α). Define α-threshold at which εb(α) = εCF (α) = ε∗ by α∗. Again,
applying the implicit function theorem, one can confirm ∂ε
b(α)
∂F < 0, ∀α ∈ [0, α
s
2), and we know
limα→αs2 ε
b(α) = εFB . Thus, there exists F > L such that, given F > F , we have: ∀α > α∗,
εb(α) < εML(α) and vice versa. i.e., given F > F , ∀α > α∗, the entire asset-substitution area is
the cost-free area.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof starts with solving optimal contract Ĉs(α) to the bank’s problem, P̂s(α) for all α ∈ [0, α∗)
and ε ∈ [εCF (α), 13 − η).
2 Then, I compare the bank’s utility V s(Ĉs(α)) with V r(Cr(α)) to derive
ε-threshold, denoted εAS(α), up to which the bank decides to induce the firm to choose the safe
one in this area.
Here, ∀α < α∗ and ∀ε > εCF (α), we know (AS) is binding and, among (TT1,↓), one obvious
2Figure A.3 illustrates all sub-areas, conditional on the bank inducing the firm to choose the safe one, for all
α ∈ [0, αs2) and ε ∈ [ε
CF (α), 1
3
− η). I skip the area IV because, after α∗ < αs1, the entire asset-substitution area is
the cost-free area (i.e., there is no need to compare the solutions with the bank’s utility V r(Cr(α))).
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Figure A.3: The Asset-Substitution Area and all sub-areas.
binding candidate is (TTHM1 ) since it decreases the firm’s incentive to choose the safe one.
3 Suppose
(TTHM1 ) is only binding among all (TT1). By plugging binding (A.8) ((TT
HM
1 )) into binding (A.14)






















































3Satisfying (TT HM1 ) is equivalent to make the firm better off with reporting H against M , which is a signal of a
safe project choice, and therefore exacerbates the firm’s safe project-choice incentive. In contrast, satisfying (TT ML1 )
is supporting (AS). Although satisfying (TT HL1 ) may also have a negative impact on (AS), the impact is less than
satisfying (TT HM1 ) since both H and L report is a signal of a risky project choice. later, I will show that indeed
(TT HL1 ), (TT
ML
1 ) are slack.






















































By plugging R̂H1,s and R̂
M
1,s from (A.16) and (A.17) into the bank’s objective function, denoted
V s(Ĉs(α)), we have following:
V s(Ĉs(α))
= −F + R̂L1,s + α(μ



































































Thus, the Lagrangian for P̂s(α) becomes:




















s =1 ∙ (1 − β̂x1s ) + λ
β̂
x1
s =0 ∙ (β̂x1s − 0),
where (A.16) and (A.17) are plugged in (LLM1 ) and (LL
H









s − F ) + [(psH + p
s






















2,s ) − λ
β̂
x1
s =1 + λβ̂
x1










































1,k ) − λ
β̂Ls =1 + λβ̂
L




















































































2,x1 = 0, x1 = M,H
∂L̂s
∂R̂LH2,s

































































































Then, ∀α ∈ [0, α∗) and ∀ε > εCF (α), the solution is as follows.
1. Area I: ε ∈ (εCF (α), ε̈(α)).
The non-zero Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ̂
H
s =1 = psH(μ
s − F ) + [(psH + p
s








−(1 − α)(μr − μs)), λβ̂
L
s =0 = [(psH + p
s
M ) − λ
M
1 ][(1 − α)((μ
s − L) + 1ηp
r
L(μ




ML] + (F − L + (psH + p
s
M )2αΔ























































M ) − λ
M




















M ) − λ
M
1 )],
and λL1 = 1 − λ
M
1 .
















, β̂Ls = 0, R̂
H
1,s =




ML, R̂M1,s = M , R̂
L











R̂x1M2,s = L − αΔ
ML
R̂x1L2,s = L
, x1 = H,L.
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2. Area II: ε ∈ (ε̈(α), ε̇(α)).
The Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ̂
H
s =1 = psH(μ
















































































































The choice variables: β̂Hs = 1, β̂
M
s = 1, β̂
L
s = 0, R̂
H
1,s = M + αΔ
HM + (psH + p
s
M ) ∙
(R̂MM2,s − L + αΔ








HM , x1 = H,M,L
R̂x1M2,s = L − αΔ
ML , x1 = H,L
R̂x1L2,s = L , x1 = H,M,L
,







)αΔML + (1−α)(psH+psM )+prM






3. Area III: ε ∈ (ε̇(α), 13 − η).
The Lagrangian Multipliers : λβ̂
H
s =1 = psH(μ







ML − (1− α)(μr − μs)),
λβ̂
M








ML− (1−α)(μr −μs)), λβ̂
L




























































The choice variables: β̂Hs = 1, β̂
M
s = 1, β̂
L































R̂x1M2,s = L − αΔ
ML
R̂x1L2,s = L
, x1 = H,L.
The proof is completed by comparing the bank’s utilities, V s(Ĉs(α)) and V r(Cr(α)) in the costly
asset substitution area: α < α∗ and ε ∈ (εCF (α), εb(α)). Here, I show the three sub-areas, I,II and
III are included in the costly asset substitution area for all F > L. It is obvious that area A is
included since εb(0) > εFB , limα→αs2 ε
b(α) = εFB (Lemma 2) and εb(α) > εCF (α) (Lemma 3). With
straight forward calculation one can confirm that εb(0) > ε̇(0), where ε̇(α) is the boundary between
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Figure A.4: Equilibrium project choice in the Asset-Substitution Area.
Area II and III, and therefore these are also included in the costly asset-substitution area
A key observation in this area is that V s(Ĉs(α)) < V r(Cr(α)), ∀ε ≥ ε̈(α) (i.e., in Areas II and
III), where ε̈(α) is the boundary between Area I and II. Therefore, there exists a unique ε-threshold,
denoted by εAS(α) ∈ (εML(α), min{εb(α), ε̈(α)}), until which the bank induces the firm to choose
the safe project.














Every other comparative statics for {β̂x1s } are as stated in Corollary 1.
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A.7 Proof of Corollary 3



































∂ε < 0, ∀ε). Therefore, the sign of
∂εAS(α)
∂α is determined by the
sign of ∂ΔV
s−r(∙)

































> 0, ∀α ∈ [0, α∗).
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Appendix B
Proofs for Optimality of Truthful
Reporting
In this Appendix, I show the optimality of the truthful reporting in the bank’s problems, Pk(α),
∀k ∈ {s, r}, and P̂s(α).
I start with Pk(α), in which the project choice is contractible. Formally, the bank has to choose
reporting strategies that it would like to induce for both periods: x̂1,k(x1) and x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2),
∀x1, x2,∈ X = {L,M,H} where x̂1,k(∙), x̂2,k(∙) ∈ R. Denote the optimal contract by Ck(α) =
{R1,k(x̂1,k) , R2,k(x̂1,k, x̂2,k), β
x̂1,k
k , x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2)}, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X = {L,M,H}.
Since the contract relies on the firm’s reports, and the firm has no resources at the outset,
the maximum amounts that the bank can charge at date 1 and 2 are as follows: R1,k(x̂1,k) ≤
min{x1, x̂1,k}, R2(x̂1,k, x̂2,k) ≤ min{x1, x̂1,k}−R1(x̂1,k)+min{x2, x̂2,k}, where x1 = min{x1|x̂1,k(x1) =
x̂1,k} and x2 = min{x2|x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2) = x̂2,k}.
1
1That is, even if the bank has learned the true realization of cash flow, if the firm’s report is manipulated downward
at date 1, x̂1,k < x1, the bank cannot charge x1 since it is impossible to prove in court (non-verifiable outcome). On
the other hand, if it is manipulated upward at date 1, x̂1,k > x1, the upper bound of the repayment becomes x1 since
the firm is protected by limited liability.
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Uk2 (x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2), x2
∣
∣x1, x̂1,k) ≥ U
k
2 (x̂1,k, x̃2, x2
∣
∣x1, x̂1,k), ∀x1, x2, x̃2, (IC2)







2 (x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2), x2)



















2 (x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2), x2)] ≥ 0, (IR)
where Uk1 (x̂1,k(x1), x1) = x1−R1,k(x̂1,k(x1))−α|x̂1,k(x1)−x1|, and U
k
2 (x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2),x2
∣
∣x1, x̂1,k) =
x2 − R2,k(x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2)) − α|x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2) − x2|,
with limited liability constraints
(LL1) : R1,k(x̂1,k) ≤ min{x1, x̂1,k},
(LL2) : R2,k(x̂1,k, x̂2,k) ≤ min{x1, x̂1,k} − R1,k(x̂1,k) + min{x2, x̂2,k},
Adapting a result in Mittendorf (2006) to my two-period setting, the following Lemma confirms
that it is optimal for the bank to ensure truthtelling for all α ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 0 In the bank’s problem Pk(α), it is optimal to induce the firm to report truthfully: ∀α ∈
[0, 1), x̂1,k(x1) = x1, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2) = x2, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 0
Suppose there exists a solution to Pk(α), denoted by C̃k(α) = {R̃1,k(x̂1,k(x1)),
R̃2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2)), β̃
x̂1,k(x1)
k , x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2)}, under which ∃xt such
that x̂t,k(∙) 6= xt for some t = 1, 2.
The proof starts with showing non-optimality of x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2) 6= x2, for any x2 ∈
X. Holding other contract terms fixed, consider the following new contract: R2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x2)
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= R̃2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2)) + α|x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2) − x2|. From the (IC2) of the con-
tract C̃k(α), we have the following:
Uk2 (x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x2), x2
∣
∣x1, x̂1,k) ≥ U
k






2 ∈ X, (B.1)
and therefore applying the triangle inequality to the right-hand side of (B.1) yields:





= x2 − R̃2,k(x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x
′
2)) − α|x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x
′
2) − x2|
≥ x2 − R̃2,k(x̂1,k, x̂2,k(x̂1,k, x1, x
′


















By construction, the left-hand side of (B.1) is Uk2 (x̂1,k, x2, x2
∣
∣x1, x̂1,k) = x2 −R2,k(x̂1,k, x2) and
therefore:
Uk2 (x̂1,k, x2, x2
∣








2 ∈ X (B.2)
That is, this new contract satisfies (IC2). Also, notice this new contract does not affect (IR).
One remaining step is to check whether this new contract satisfies the limited liability constraints.
Here, R2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x2) ≤ x2, ∀x2 since otherwise C̃k(α) is not incentive compatible with the original
(IC2) for x̃2 = L, because:
Uk2 (x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2), x2)
= x2 − R̃2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x̂2,k(x1, x̂1,k(x1), x2)) − α|x̂2,k(x1, x̂1,k(x1), x2) − x2|
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< Uk2 (x̂1,k(x1), L, x2) = x2 − R̃2,k(x̂1,k(x1), L) − α|L − x2|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥(1−α)(x2−L)≥0
The proof is completed by showing x̂1,k(x1) 6= x1, for any x1, is not optimal. Since












2 (x̂1,k(x1), x2). Then, from the (IC1) of the contract C̃
k(α), we have following:

















1 ∈ X (B.3)
Now, under C̃k(α), suppose there exists x1 such that x̂1,k(x1) = x̂1 > x1 and x1 − R̃1,k(x̂1) −
α|x̂1 − x1| < 0, ∀α ∈ (0, 1). Then, I show C̃k(α) has the following structural characteristic.
Claim 1 If x̂1,k(x1) = x̂1 > x1, then x̂1,k(x
′
1) = x̂1 for all x
′
1 ∈ (x1, x̂1].
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B.1.1 Proof of Claim 1
Applying x̂1,k(x1) = x̂1 to (B.3), we have following:



















1 ∈ X (B.4)
Pick any x
′
1 ∈ (x1, x̂1] and suppose x̂1,k(x
′
1) 6= x̂1. Applying the triangle inequality to the
right-hand side of (B.4) and adding x
′
1 to both sides, we have following:
x
′
































































Thus, it is a contradiction and therefore, ∀x
′
1 ∈ (x1, x̂1], x̂1,k(x
′
1) = x̂1.
From Claim 1, given x̂1,k(x1) = x̂1, we also know @ x
′
1 ∈ X such that x̂1,k(x
′
1) ∈ [x1, x̂1). But
then, the bank can get strictly better off with following new contract: ∀x
′


























1}]. Notice this new contract does not violate the limited liability since R̃1,k(x̂1) ≤ x1.
Also, it satisfies every (IC1) since the bank only increases {R1,k(∙)} less than the amount that each
(IC1) is relaxed by switching to truthtelling. Thus, x̂1,k(x1) = x̂1 > x1 and x1 − R̃1,k(x̂1)− α|x̂1 −
x1| < 0 in C̃k(α) is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose for all x̂1,k(x1) 6= x1, x1 − R̃1,k(x̂1,k(x1)) − α|x̂1,k(x1) − x1| ≥ 0 in C̃k(α).2
Now, consider the following new contract that elicits truthtelling: R1,k(x1) = R̃1,k(x̂1,k(x1)) +





3 Again, by applying the
2Technically, if x̂1,k(x1) < x1, then this condition is always satisfied. The case with x̂1,k(x1) > x1 and x1 −
R̃1,k(x̂1,k(x1)) − α|x̂1,k(x1)) − x1| < 0 was already covered in the previous part.
3Recall, from (B.2), I already show that x̂2,k(x̂1,k(x1), x1, x2) = x2, ∀x2 ∈ X.
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triangle inequality to the right-hand side of (B.3):
Uk1 (x̂1,k(x
′































































By construction, the left-hand side of (B.3) is Uk1 (x̂1,k(x1), x1) = x1 − R1,k(x̂1,k(x1)) + β
x1
k ∙
EUk2 (x1) and therefore:


















1 ∈ X (B.6)
Thus, this new contract satisfies (IC1). Also, notice it does not affect (IR). Finally, since
x1 − R1,k(x1) = x1 − R̃1,k(x̂1,k(x1)) − α|x̂1,k(x1) − x1| ≥ 0, (LL1) is also satisfied. Overall, from
(B.2) and (B.6), the bank gets strictly better off with the new contract, which is the direct revelation
mechanism.
Now, consider P̂s(α) in which the bank induces the firm to choose the safe project in the entire
costly asset substitution area. Denote the optimal contract by Ĉs(α) = {R̂1,s(x̂1,s), R̂2,s(x̂1,s, x̂2,s),
β̂
x̂1,s
s , x̂1,s(x1), x̂2,s(x̂1,s(x1), x1, x2)}. Formally, the following project choice constraint needs to be
added on Pk(α), with k = s, to describe P̂s(α): U s(Ĉs(α)) ≥ U r(Ĉs(α)) (AS)
Lemma 0′ In the bank’s problem P̂s(α), it is optimal to induce the firm to report truthfully:
x̂1,s(x1) = x1, x̂2,s(x̂1,s, x1, x2) = x2, ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 0 ′
Suppose the contract C̃k(α) with k = s in Lemma 0 satisfies the project choice constraint (AS).

























2 (x̂1,s(x1), x̂2,s(x̂1,s(x1), x1, x2), x2)]
With a straight forward plugging, one can confirm that the suggested contract in Lemma 0,
which eliciting truthtelling, does not violate (AS).
